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I
INTRODUCTION

The major thrust of this article is to examine the theory and practice of the
constitutionally prescribed functions of local governments in Japan. We will
first describe how local government has been guaranteed under the 1947
Constitution. We will touch on the circumstances under which the
Constitution came to include the principle of local autonomy in its provisions.
Second, we will describe how those constitutional provisions regarding the
local governments have developed in relation to the national government.
These findings will show the centralization of national power and the erosion
of local autonomy in postwar Japan. Third, we will describe how local
governments today seem to cope with centralized national power. The focus
of our discussion of national-local relationships will not be on the state of
local autonomy that the Constitution anticipated at the time of its enactment.
Instead, the discussion will deal with the state of local autonomy as it has
evolved under the Constitution. Local autonomy under the current
Constitution is based on the principle of civilian control, and this principle
should never be compromised lest characteristics of local autonomy be
changed. Otherwise, local identities based on the nature, the culture, and the
mentalities of each district may be weakened or even lost. There always must
be an adequate sharing of governing functions between the local and central
governments. Today, however, the national government tends to manage
even matters of local concern as national matters by delegating authority to
the heads of the local communities through laws and government ordinances.
In Japan this procedure is called "agency delegation"; however, local
government should not be obliged to follow this procedure all the time. In
the next section, this article will discuss the specific ways in which autonomy
should be practiced.
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II
LOCAL AUTONOMY CONCEIVED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

This section will first describe how the Constitution guarantees local
autonomy in relation to the central government. In 1947 the Constitution
and the Local Autonomy Acts reformed the political structure under the Meiji
Constitution based on the ideas of freedom and democracy. Reform through
the Local Autonomy Acts was guided by the General Headquarters ("GHQ'),
which realized that public local entities were the lowest unit of the central
government's structure in prewar Japan and had the least amount of
autonomy.' These considerations also led to the establishment of human
rights and new political structures. The Supreme Commander of Allied
Powers ("SCAP") was steadfast in insisting on organizing a committee on
local government reform and also inserting clear provisions on local
autonomy in the Constitution.
In the process of the committee deliberations, two different opinions
appeared. One group, led by Merle Rowell, suggested that the newly
organized local governments be tailored in an American fashion. Indeed, the
group advocating the American model went so far as to suggest a "home
rule" provision forJapan. In contrast, another group spearheaded by Charles
Kades took an approach that recognized a long tradition of central control in
Japanese history. The latter contended that some degree of centralization
would be inevitable even under a democratic system of a postwar government.
Having had strenuous discussions on these issues, on March 13, 1946,
SCAP finally came up with its reform idea for Japanese local governments,
which General Whitney, legal chief of SCAP, submitted to Shoji Matsumoto,
chairman of the Investigation Committee for Constitutional Affairs. 2 There
was no article for local government in the draft Constitution submitted by the
government of Japan. 3 However, the draft Constitution designated by SCAP
contained rules for the direct election of each governor, mayor, and local and
prefectural assemblyman. It also included the right of local governments to
enact their own charters and, by consent of the majority of voters, to establish
4
a special ordinance applicable to only one local public entity.

1. M. NARUMI, SENGO JICHITAI KAIKAKUSHI 44 (1982); Tanaka, ChihoJichi, in SHINKENPOU NO
KENKYU 320 (1953).
2. M. NARUMI, supra note 1, at 44; K. TAKAYANAGI, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEITEI NO KATEI 264
(1978); Amano, ChihouJichiSeido no Kaikaku, 3 SENGOKAIKAKU 260 (1974).
3. The GHQ criticized the draft Constitution submitted by the Japanese Government, saying
there were no regulations on local autonomy:
The draft byJ. Matsumoto lacks two most important points. It does not mention anything
about local governments. There are no guarantees or proposals for the inhabitants of the
local public entities to participate in their own local political matters. Moreover, there
entirely lacks the stipulation that the Constitution is the supreme law of the nation. This
would mean that the Japanese nation remains the same as before and that the organizations
beyond the laws which have been the main character of the past Japanese political system
still are out of the laws. These are the crucial points of the draft.
M. NARUMI, supra note 1, at 44; see also K. STEINER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 69-71 (1965).
4. The relevant contents of the draft Constitution are as follows:
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The Japanese Government, especially the Ministry of Interior, expressed
disapproval of that draft, and objected to the direct election of prefectural
governors. As a result, based on the draft by the GHQ, the Constitution has
come to provide for the following: (1) rules and regulations governing local
public entities to be fixed in accordance with "the principle of local
autonomy"; (2) the direct popular election of executive officers and assembly
members in all local public entities; (3) the right of local public entities to
manage local government property, affairs, and administration and to enact
their own regulations; and (4) consent by the majority of the voters before any
special law applicable to one local public entity can be enacted by the Diet.
As these rules express, it is significant that the Constitution guarantees
local autonomy. The following points are especially important. First, the
Constitution clearly points to the essence of local autonomy. The
introduction of the principle of local autonomy in the Constitution implies the
protection of the local governments against the national government, and at
the same time initiates the development of local autonomy. Second, the
Constitution purports to guarantee that the national government does not
necessarily restrict or violate the rights of local public entities. Third, the
Constitution expressly and positively delegates powers to local public entities.
Local public entities have the power to manage and administer their own
affairs to insure social welfare in their communities and to maintain public
order and security. Thus, local public entities have acquired financial,
executive, and legislative powers.
III
FACTORS IMPEDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Local self-government has not worked out precisely as the Constitution
had designed. The reasons are as follows. First, there already were defects in
local self-government before the establishment of the 1947 Constitution.
Under the old system, a large number of services that should have been
treated as local affairs fell under national jurisdiction. There still persists a
tendency of central control in the areas of finance and employment, as well as
Chapter 8, Local Government;
Article 86; The governors of prefectures, the mayors of cities and towns and the chief
executive officers of all other subordinate bodies politic and corporate hav[ing] taxing
power, the members of prefectural and local legislative assemblies, and such other
prefectural and local officials as the Diet may determine, shall be elected by direct popular
vote within their several communities.
Article 87; The inhabitants of metropolitan areas, cities and towns shall be secure in their
rights to manage their property, affairs and government and to frame their own charters
within such laws as the Diet may enact.
Article 88; The Diet shall pass no local or special act applicable to a metropolitan area, city
and town where a general act can be made applicable, unless it be made subject to the
acceptance of a majority of electorate of such community.
Cf 1947 CONST. arts. 92-95.
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police and education. 5 This tendency increased after the rapid economic
growth of the 1960s and has grown after the subsequent great expansion of
executive powers in Tokyo. The dependence on the national government has
been growing without much transfer of central power to local governments.
The areas that local public entities alone have the right to manage are rather
limited.
Second, the dependence on the national government reflects the longlasting dominance of the national bureaucrats and their distrust of local
governments. 6 National bureaucrats are confident in their management of
local governments and they oversee the local governments' executive affairs,
sources of revenue, and personnel matters. Even if it is better to have these
affairs managed by the local government, the national bureaucrats distrust
local management and are reluctant to transfer their power. Today, local
government employees are more capable than in earlier years and have the
support and the participation of local communities. However, national
bureaucrats justify their dominance by pointing out the inefficient and
uneconomical local management.
Third, although revenue between national and local governments is
distributed in accordance with the national tax base, revenue to local
governments has not increased significantly over the years. Consequently,
there has been a lack of general revenue for local governments, and local
governments must depend on special revenue sources like grants from the
National Treasury. This enhances the control of the national government in
the area of finance and perpetuates the low level of funding for local
7
government.
Recognizing these deficiencies in local government, and the relationship
between national and local governments, many reform plans have been
considered and continue to hold merit today. However, any reform plan must
reflect the current state of local government, and, in this respect, there exist
difficult barriers to surmount.8
First, we must consider the impact of social and financial changes on local
governments. The rapid progress of technology in Japan has created high
standards of living in industrial areas. As a result, life has changed from an
agricultural to an urban style. At the same time, the development of new
modes of transportation, such as air and the bullet train, has had great
influence over each community near a transportation facility. These changes
5. Y. YOSHIDA, CHIIKI KARA NO HEIWA TO JICHI 89 (1985); Hoshino, Keisatsseido no Kaikaku, 3
SENGOKAIKAKU SEIJIKATEI 326-50 (1974). Under the old regime, police and educational affairs were
controlled by the national government. The new Japanese Constitution, however, provided for these
to fall under local control, thus showing the democratic trend. In 1954 though, the Police Law was
revised, and in 1956 the Laws on the Organization and Management of Local Educational
Administration were enacted. These laws once again increased the national government's power
over the local government. See K. STEINER, supra note 3, at 90-98 (tracing the political history of the
decentralization of police and education).
6. Tanaka, Chiho Jichi no Gendaileki Kadai, 622 JURIST 18 (1976).
7.

K. STEINER, supra note 3, at 263-93; Y. YOSHIDA, supra note 5, at 90.

8.

N.

HARADA, CHIHOUJICHI

26-27 (1983).
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will increase the demands on local government as iocal communities expand
and become more complex.
Second, there is a growing demand for a higher level of social welfare.
Local public entities now have responsibility for the work of both the national
and local governments; for example, they must maintain social welfare and a
clean environment for the residents. However, most local governments do
not have sufficient revenue to implement those policies. Instead, they must
request support from the national government, which, in turn, strengthens its
regulations and controls over local governments and increases the level of
conflict with local powers. This transforms the local government system
conceived in 1947.
IV
TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ROLE
OF VOTERS

We have noted the problems that impede the development of local
government. The main problem is the attitude of the national government
toward local government. However, it is important to note that since the
latter half of the 1960s-a time of rapid economic development in Japanpeople in many communities have expressed their frustration with and
indignation towards the attitude of the national government. These people
have also increasingly asserted their rights and powers and have brought
about the following changes in local government.
First, each local government, acting under the national policies of industry
and development, competed to develop lands, to build industrial complexes,
and to attract large factories. There has been tremendous local industrial
development, and newly industrialized cities have emerged as the core of
many local urban communities. Lack of revenue forced local governments to
neglect environmental problems such as pollution. A deterioration of the
environment all over the country began to annoy the citizens. The citizens
protested against the government's inaction and demanded relief and aid
from the national and local governments and from large corporations. 9
Both the national and local governments have responded to the public
complaints on the natural environment. Faced with these problems, the
national government in 1970 finally established an agency for environmental
pollution and enacted legislation to protect clean water and air and to
promote a clean environment. Recently, local governments, too, have begun
9. Some of those protests are illustrated by the four major pollution lawsuits. Y. YOSHIDA,
supra note 5, at 91. The four major suits are: Watanabe v. Chisso K.K. (The Minamata Disease Suit),
696 HanreiJih6 1641 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., Mar. 20, 1973); Shino v. Shawa Yokkaichi Sekiyu (The
Yukkacachi Asthma Case), 672 Hanrei Jiho 30 (Tsu Dist. Ct., July 24, 1972), cited in J. GRESSOR, K.
FEJIKURA & A. MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INJAPAN 434 n. 13, 435 nn. 16, 20, 27 (1981); B6no v.
Sh~wa Denko K.K. (The Mercury Poisoning Suit), 642 Hanrei Jih6 96 (Niigata Dist. Ct., Sept. 29,
1971); and Komatsu v. Mitsui Kinzoku K6gy6 K.K. (The Itai-Itai Disease Suit), 635 Hanrei Jih6 17
(Toyama Dist. Ct.,June 30, 1971), aff'd on K6so appeal, 674 HanreiJiho 25 (Nagoya H. Ct., Kanzawa
Br., Aug. 9, 1972);
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to demonstrate a positive attitude toward protection of the environment.
They conclude agreements with large enterprises to provide for protection
against pollution and to draw up urban plans. Unfortunately, environmental
problems cannot be solved unless local governments unite themselves.
Second, basic urban planning appeared in many local governments in the
1970s. These plans were designed (1) to clarify the development goals of
local government; (2) to set the basic principles to pursue through
development; (3) to assess the needs of citizens; and (4) to define an overall
time period in which the plans could be completed. Local governments in all
prefectures in Japan have made many distinctive long-term plans.' 0 The plans
are basic, and cover various areas, such as consolidation of urban activities
regarding health and hygiene. In the process of making up the long-term
basic plans, local governments have been supported by the people in each
community. The people have participated in various forms, but mainly by
organizing conferences involving the members of a local community and
selecting a committee from the community to work with local government on
these issues.
Third, local governments have begun to look for steady sources of revenue
to manage their new urban planning. The lack of revenue may be solved by
changing the ratio of tax revenues distributed between the national
government and local governments and by seeking new sources of revenue
for local governments. The reform of grants from the national government
might also be helpful. In fact, local governments pressed the argument for
their right to manage their own taxation, litigation, or debt financing.
However, the national government has rejected these arguments and
introduced its own proposals without paying any attention to the local
industries that have been developed by local governments' own efforts. The
national government will continue to play the same role as before and will
never release the power of the purse to local governments.
In the 1980s, the national government developed the concept of the
"technopolis," which is made up of the various kinds of technological
enterprises.'
The concept consists of building a research center in a
designated city, which is then encouraged to invite leading technological
industries and institutions to harmonize industries, government offices,
institutions, and the people in that community. Nineteen districts or cities are
already designated as technopolises, and the numbers are increasing. There
is intense competition for designation among cities. However, it is dangerous
to have great expectations for the development of the technopolis in the
future. First, a technopolis is an outlet for excess capital and may be subject
to economic recessions and trade friction. The technopolis plan may then
become like the earlier policy of inviting outside factories to develop
industrial centers-a policy that became a burden to local governments.
Second, the organic relation between the local community and industry
10.
11.

Y. YOSHIDA, supra note 5, at 92.
Id. at 95.
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cannot grow in the technopolis due to a possible fear that the technopolis may
deplete local resources and capital. Third, local cities cannot supply the
trained employees necessary for highly technological operations.
Considering the points discussed above, local governments must be very
careful in adopting a technopolis program, for there is no clear answer as to
whether it secures financial resources for local governments.
V
THE PROBLEMS OF LOCAL AUTONOMOUS REGULATIONS

In order for local autonomy to come to fruition, local governments must
be able to legislate their own ordinances. The establishment of sublegislation
had its peak in the latter half of the 1970s and in the 1980s. The contents of
those regulations are classified as follows:
1. Regulations relating to the general administration (including the
ethics of local assembly members and the freedom of
information).
2. Regulations relating to local taxes (including taxes to preserve the
cultural heritage of ancient cities).
3. Regulations relating to the protections against public pollution
(including environmental pollution and bicycle parking).
4. Regulations relating to social welfare (including old-age benefits
and social welfare payments for citizens).
5. Regulations relating to education (including grants for tuition in
private high schools and kindergartens and the election of
members of the educational committee). 12
Some regulations only fill in blanks in the national laws, but there is local
autonomous legislation, often reflecting creativity in deriving unique
solutions to local problems. There are two kinds of autonomous legislation:
regulations directly established by voters and regulations established by local
government at the request of citizens. Autonomous local regulations may
cover a wide range of matters, but must conform to the Constitution. They
must also be related to the local interests and be in accordance with the
national laws. 13 Regulations by the local legislatures usually do not provide
for penalties, but only for guidance, warnings, investigations, and sometimes
official announcements of the names of offenders. From the above
standpoint, the following problems are raised concerning the contents of
regulations.
First, there are no local regulations relating to the utilization of land and
buildings. Most local governments are hesitant to establish regulations over
personal property transactions that have national ramifications. Therefore,
12. See M. KANEKO, JICHITAI HOUGAKU 146 (1988); Y. YOSHIDA, supra note 5, at 97; Daiichihoki,
The New Trend of Local Government, 24 Hou TO SEISAKU (LAW AND POLICY) (1983) (classifying and
explaining many kinds of regulations).
13. Local Autonomy Law, Law No. 67, 1947, art. 14.
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these transactions are subject to the control of the national law.1 4 However,
in order to maintain the security and health of local citizens, local
governments consider it imperative to regulate the property rights of
individuals at least minimally if these rights adversely affect residents and the
regional communities. Thus, under these circumstances, the exercise of
property rights can be regulated by local ordinances on a case by case basis.
The Supreme Court decision in Japan v. Iida is an example: "The Regulation
of Reservoirs in this case derives from the necessity in social living to prevent
in advance the natural calamities; therefore the person who holds the
property right to use the bank of the reservoir assumes the duty to bear such
regulation for the public welfare."' 5 The Supreme Court, at present, has only
permitted the local regulation of property rights from the standpoint of
preventing calamities or other disasters. However, it is assumed that the
Supreme Court would apply that interpretation to an instance in which a local
government tries to regulate property rights to build new communities.
Second, it is important to determine whether local governments can add
stricter conditions to national regulations to achieve the same objectives. If
they can, they may be able to acquire a new power for themselves. Here, the
Fundamental Law for the Public Pollution, and the Regulation for the
Prevention of the Public Pollution, are typical examples. In 1969, Tokyo
enacted the Regulations for the Prevention of the Public Pollution, which
included stricter provisions than the national law. In 1975, the Supreme
Court commented as follows on the relationship of the law and regulation: "If
the law aims at a nationwide standard [establishing a] maximum limit, the
regulations will not go beyond the provisions; but if the law establishes a
minimum standard, local public entities are able to strengthen the national
regulations in accordance with the conditions of each district."' 16 A new
regulation is not permitted, therefore, when the national law has strict
7
provisions in accordance with the conditions of the local community.'
Third, there are hardly any local provisions directed at eliminating
revenue shortages in local government. There are many theories holding that
local ordinances permitting taxation by local governments are against the
constitutional principle of taxation by the national government' 8 and that
local governments may establish regulations for local self-taxation only in

14. 1947 CONST. art. 29(3); see also Hamakawa,Jishujourei no Kadai to Genjou, 53 HOURITSUJIHOU
40 (1981).
15. 17 Keishfi 521 (June 26, 1963).
16. 29 Keishii 489 (Sept. 10, 1975).
17. T. Muroi stated:
The national control under the national laws against the regulations of local government
should designate the minimal standard, from the standpoint of all ... people of the nation;
that is the most influential view of ... local autonomy in the academic field today; therefore
it would not violate the Constitution even if the regulations limit the administrative activities
of pollution problems.
Muroi, Kougaitaisaku ni okeru Houritsu to jourei, in CHIHOUJICHI 117 (1977).
18. 1947 CONST. art. 84.
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accordance with the Local Tax Law. 19 However, a recently emerging theory
proposes that the power for local self-taxation is concomitant with the
constitutional guarantee of local self-government. Also, the Local Tax Law is
only a general law providing guidelines for taxation procedures by local
public entities. 20 From that standpoint, it is believed that the power of the
State Minister Without Portfolio to approve or disapprove a local authority's
application of the new non-legalized universal tax is contrary to the
Constitution. According to the Local Tax Law, "the prefectures, in
establishing or changing the nonlegalized universal taxes, must have prior
21
permission of the Home Minister Without Portfolio."
It is also postulated that the new nonlegalized universal taxation may not
be permitted because it gives citizens a heavier tax burden, impedes the
circulation of goods in local public entities, and does not fit with the economic
policies of the national government. 22 Moreover, the Home Minister Without
Portfolio has the right to add new conditions or change the content of the
local regulations that the local government sublegislates. 2 3 Local selftaxation may prevent intervention by the national government in the affairs of
local governments. The power of local self-taxation will not lead to
irresponsible taxation by local authorities.
Those who propose self-taxation by local governments argue that the
present system of taxation is an invasion of local autonomy. They view the
national government recommendation of a policy change abolishing the local
tax as an unreasonable intervention against self-taxation of the local
government, which is supported financially by the local taxes. The judicial
judgment on this point is as follows:
The power of self-taxation by local public entities is permitted only under the Local
Tax Law of the national government. When the Local Tax Law does not allow a
surtax on charges of24electricity and gas, local governments are not able to add a surtax
on the same items.

In our opinion, the power of local governments to implement regulations
is gaining momentum gradually through public debate and judicial precedent.
However, the local authorities still do not have the power to pass regulations
that conflict with national law.
VI
AUTHORITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE

REFORM

In the 1980s, under its own planned administration, local government
attempted to achieve genuine autonomy through autonomous regulations

21.
22.

Local Tax Law, Law No 226, 1950 art. 3,
1.
H. KITANO, KENP6 TO ZEIZAISEI 174 (1983).
Local Tax Law, art. 259.
Id. art. 261,
1; see also H. KITANO, supra note 20, at 202-12.

23.
24.

Local Tax Law, art. 261,
2.
966 HanreiJih6 3 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., June 5, 1980).

19.

20.
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that would comply with the residents' administrative demands. However,
interference from the national government continues, and the new
administrative reform may impede the establishment of greater autonomy in
local government.
First, the national government has delegated agency functions to the local
government but has given them no source of revenue. 25 At present, local
affairs, even affairs tinged with local interests, belong to and are controlled by
the national bureaucracy in accordance with national laws and regulations.
For example, delegated to the metropolitan and prefectural governors are
livelihood protection, health insurance, welfare annuity, national annuity,
permits for restaurants, and licenses for businesses of environment sanitation
(for example, barbers, beauty parlors, and cleaning services). Delegated to
local agencies are, for example, livelihood protection, child allowance,
entrance management of nursery schools, and registration of foreigners. As
these examples illustrate, the scope of agency delegation is great, and under
existing conditions, this delegated work represents about 40 percent of a
municipality's daily work, and 70 to 80 percent of metropolitan and
prefectural districts' daily work. A great part of the work is regarded as the
affair of the nation. They are thus under the instruction or the direction of
the national government. In recent years, agency delegation under the new
administrative reform has been justified and part of the national government's
affairs have been shifted to the local public entities. However, the source of
funding for these programs has not been shifted to the local government.
Therefore, local public entities engage in deficit financing and are forced to
make a choice of discontinuing their activities and services, or delegating
them to private enterprise. 26 The latter choice has drawn the criticism that
the local public entities are abandoning their responsibilities.
25. With regard to agency-delegation affairs (Kikanininjimu), orders have been established for
the execution of the task and its legal enforcement procedure; that is,
the minister concerned, in writing, designates the reason and the period, and orders the
local governor to perform the items which should be done in case the management or
execution of the national affairs which belong to the governor's authority as an institution of
the state are against the regulation under the law or against the management by the minister
concerned, and in case that management or the execution of the national affairs has been
neglected.
Local Autonomy Law, art. 146, i. Article 146, paragraph 2, states that "the minister concerned can
ask for a trial before the high court to order the governor to perform the items concerned." In order
to decide those matters "against the governor concerned, the high court concerned must start the
trial to order the governor to perform the items concerned and determine if the claim by the
governor has been admitted properly." Id. 5. If the governor still neglects the order by the high
court and has not performed the items concerned, the minister concerned is able to ask the high
court to start the trial of the confirmation of the fact. Id. 6. After the trial of the confirmation has
started, the minister concerned, in place of the governor, can exercise the items concerned. Id. 7.
Also, the Prime Minister has a right to dismiss the governor concerned. Id. 8.
Of affairs delegated by the national government to the mayors of cities and towns, the rights of
the minister concerned and the Prime Minister are exercised by the governor, and the lawsuit for
enforcement takes place at the district court. Id. 12.
26. Of the charge to the private enterprise, see T. MUROl, GYOUSEI NO MINSHUTEKITOUSEI TO
GYOUSEIHOU 230 (1989).

Page 123: Winter 1990]

AUTHORITY OF GOVERNMENTS

Second, the Ministry of Home Affairs has given notice of a rationalization
of the local self-governance system and has delegated the responsibility for
the determination and distribution of welfare and retirement allowances to
the local public entities. As the reason for this notice, the Ministry of Home
Affairs has stated that welfare and retirement allowances are higher in some
local governments than they are in the national government. There is also an
excessive number of regular staff in some local public entities. However, each
subject is a problem for the local public entity to solve independently. The
national government must not interfere.
Third, reforms are being proposed in the local system to administer wide
areas. The transformation of prefectural systems to nine block regions
(doshusei) came from the business world and is the subject of great debate.
Under this concept, metropolitan and prefectural systems will be merged into
new governrmental units that are branch offices of the national government.
Fourth, the Ministry of Home Affairs plays a leading role in reducing
quorums in local assemblies, a plan designated to decrease the size and
increase the efficiency of local administrations. 2 7 However, local
administrations should not be reduced under the leadership of the Ministry of
Home Affairs. Administrative reforms by the national government seem to be
aimed at the standardization of local autonomy and may constitute
interference in local autonomous entities. The principle of local autonomy in
Article 92 of the Constitution is in danger of failing.
VII
CONCLUSION

We have analyzed the relationship of authority between local autonomous
entities and the national government. Emphasis has been on the maintenance
of local autonomy. Local autonomy, which was established under the
Constitution, is still a problematic issue in the Japanese political system. The
interference of the national government has increased, and local autonomy
does not fulfill its function as envisioned in the Constitution. It is up to local
inhabitants to be aware of these problems and their right to self-governance.
It is very important that properly local affairs, which also are considered
national affairs under the jurisdiction of the national government, be shifted
promptly to local governments and be considered the affairs of local
government by the national government. This action must be taken if local
autonomy is to fulfill its major role as a fortress for protecting the
constitutional rights of the people in each community.

27.

Y. YOSHIDA, supra note 5, at 105-06.

